Can British drones help secure the strait of Hormuz for international shipping?

Australian Camera / Shutterstock After pressing allies for support – and being rebuffed – US president Donald Trump now insists that the United States can reopen the Strait of Hormuz alone. However, this would focus the risk on US forces and stretch limited naval resources. Some 20% of global oil flows ordinarily passing through Hormuz; closure of the strait has caused oil prices to soar. British prime minister Keir Starmer has refused to let the UK be drawn into a wider war in the Middle East. However, he has said he is “looking through the options” on helping secure the strait for shipping. The UK military has already stated that it is considering sending two drone types to the strait of Hormuz: interceptors, to counter Iranian drones, and mine-hunters. These could help ensure the security of shipping in the region, but their task will not be straightforward. Iran is believed to have around 6,000 sea mines, ranging from simple contact types like the Maham-1 – anchored in place and triggered on impact – to more advanced systems such as the Chinese-designed EM-52, which sit on the seabed and fire a rocket at ships with specific acoustic or magnetic signatures. So far, only a handful of mines are understood to have been deployed, often covertly at night or using traditional sailing ships to evade detection. Divers are also used, in the case of limpet mines, to manually attach these devices to a ship’s hull and detonate them remotely. Even limited mining efforts deter commercial shipping, as crews, insurers and operators refuse to risk transit. The mine threat is only one layer. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has built a broader anti-access system: fast attack craft, shore-based anti-ship missiles – such as the Noor/C802 – and one-way attack drones, such as the Shahed-136, which is so effective the Americans are now copying it. These can be launched from concealed positions along the coastline, allowing Tehran to threaten vessels across the strait. The result is a multi-domain problem. A ship attempting to transit must contend simultaneously with threats from below the water, across the surface and from the air. This technology enables selective disruption. Iran is targeting the vessels of specific countries while allowing others to pass, preserving its own oil exports while exerting pressure on the US and its allies. In theory, reopening the strait is straightforward: clear the mines, escort shipping and deter further attacks. In practice, western navies are poorly configured for this. Mine warfare has been deprioritised for decades. The US has historically devoted less than 1% of its naval budget to it, despite mines accounting for 80% of US warships sunk or damaged since 1945. Its Avenger-class minesweepers are being retired, replaced by platforms reliant on unmanned systems. European fleets face similar constraints. The Royal Navy’s last minehunter in the Gulf, HMS Middleton, left for maintenance shortly before the current crisis. Of the seven vessels in the fleet, four are unavailable, with the remaining three earmarked to protect home waters and UK submarines. Vulnerable to attack Even where mine countermeasure vessels exist, they are ill-suited to Hormuz. They operate slowly and close to the threat, using sonar and remotely operated vehicles to locate and neutralise mines. In a contested environment, this places them within range of missiles and drones, requiring escort ships – which are similarly scarce. Autonomous minehunters include the Royal Navy’s Sweep system. Instead of detecting and then destroying mines in separate stages and with separate tools, Sweep uses an uncrewed surface vessel towing three sensor boats that replicate the magnetic, acoustic and electrical signature of a ship. This effectively tricks mines into detonating harmlessly at a distance. It entered service in 2025 and can be controlled remotely from a ship or portable platform. These systems nevertheless remain limited in number and untested in combat. The control ships and command nodes may also have to operate within range of Iranian aerial weapons. That includes Shahed drones. With a cost of US$35,000 (£26,000) each, these are effective at overwhelming traditional air defences, exhausting expensive interceptor stocks like the Patriot, which costs $4 million per missile. The economics are forcing the development of cheaper responses. Interceptor drones, such as the UK-produced Octopus system, use onboard sensors and AI-driven image recognition to physically collide with incoming drones like the Shahed. Costing less than a tenth of the target, they offer a far more scalable defence than high-end missiles. The US faces challenges if it intends to go it alone on reopening the strait. Mine clearance is inherently slow. The last major western operation of this kind, after the 1991 Gulf war, took more than seven weeks. Doing this alone would concentrate risk on US forces and stretch already limited mine countermeasure capacity. Other possibilities like helicopters with anti-mine capabilities would not be able to overcome the threat posed by drones or missiles. At the same time, Washington has targeted Iranian minelaying vessels and naval facilities. A marine force is also en route, raising the possibility of operations against Iranian coastal drone and missile launch sites. But this would involve putting boots on the ground – something unpalatable to many, even within the Trump administration. Immediate impact Europe, despite political hesitation, is unlikely to remain absent. The economic impact of disruption in Hormuz is immediate. Deploying autonomous counter-mine and counter-drone systems already in the region could be framed not as joining a controversial war, but as restoring freedom of navigation in a vital international waterway. There are reputational factors at play, too. The untimely withdrawal of mine-hunting vessels has strained trust with Gulf partners, particularly for countries like the UK that had committed to their security. Reinforcing capabilities to the region could help repair that relationship. However, systems like Octopus are currently needed in Ukraine. Diverting them to the Middle East to defend against Iranian Shaheds would deny Kyiv a vital capability. Already, more Patriot missiles have been launched by the Gulf states to protect their airspace than Ukraine has in four years of war. While Trump may be right that the US does not need European assistance, that is not the most important question. The real dilemma is whether any western military – acting alone or together – can quickly, safely and sustainably secure one of the world’s most critical waterways against a layered, modern threat. That is a much harder test.

Arun Dawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.