How Washington Can Help Lebanon

The United States has a historic chance to restore its old relationship with Lebanon and to broker peace between Lebanon and Israel. But seizing that opportunity would require more robust and sustained U.S. diplomatic engagement than what we have seen thus far. The Trump administration’s attention is fixed on its war with Iran. But in Lebanon, meanwhile, more than 886 people have been killed by Israeli strikes, and nearly 1 million, or about a quarter of the country’s population, have been forced to evacuate. Add that to an economic crisis that is now in its seventh year, and you have all the makings of a humanitarian catastrophe. U.S. diplomacy in Lebanon should focus on helping the Lebanese government solve the problem of Hezbollah, the Shia militia that has dragged Lebanon into another war by firing rockets at Israel in support of its ally Iran—the same group that has done everything in its power to prevent the emergence of a strong Lebanese state and to derail the U.S.-Lebanon relationship. By refusing to lay down its arms and give up its allegiance to Iran, Hezbollah has for decades effectively thwarted the Lebanese state-rebuilding process. For all the complexities of Lebanese governance and the ailments of the Lebanese sectarian system, nothing has been more detrimental to the cause of freedom, sovereignty, and economic prosperity than the radical rhetoric and militant activities of Hezbollah. [Elizabeth Tsurkov: Iran’s war is not only with the West] Countering Hezbollah, though, requires a more nuanced approach than the one Israel has adopted. Although Israel’s air strikes have significantly degraded Hezbollah’s military capabilities, the death and destruction Israel has inflicted on Lebanon is immoral and counterproductive. In the war between Hezbollah and Israel in the summer of 2006, which was also triggered by Hezbollah attacking Israeli soldiers at the border, Israel effectively dented the group’s war-fighting power. But it did that while destroying much of southern Lebanon, damaging Lebanese physical infrastructure and the southern suburbs of Beirut and causing the deaths of 1,109 Lebanese, the large majority of whom were civilians. An estimated 1 million people were displaced. After 34 days of fighting, a cease-fire was reached, allowing Hezbollah to rise from the ashes and declare a “divine victory.” The main lesson of that bloody episode, and of Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza today, is that brute force alone cannot solve political problems. America’s allies in Lebanon are the majority of the Lebanese people—now represented by a largely pro-U.S. and reform-oriented government led by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. They want what the U.S. wants: an independent, sovereign, and prosperous Lebanon at peace with its neighbors; a beacon of hope for religious coexistence and, as the late Pope John Paul II said, a message of freedom and an example of pluralism for the East as for the West. Early last year, the Lebanese government issued a historic policy aimed at disarming Hezbollah and restoring the monopoly over the use of force to the Lebanese state and its armed forces. Washington should support the Lebanese government in pursuing this mutually beneficial objective. But by making little distinction between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, Israel once again risks weakening Washington’s allies, as imperfect as they may be, and alienating the Lebanese people. Yet first, the Lebanese government must assume its own responsibilities. Aoun’s recent call for direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel is commendable. But it has fallen on deaf ears, because neither Israel nor the U.S. has much confidence in the Lebanese government’s willingness or ability to disarm Hezbollah. The U.S. can strengthen the latter, but it can’t force the former. It also cannot dictate the terms, structure, or framework of the proposed Lebanon-Israel talks—which would be up to Lebanese and Israeli officials to decide—although it can help shape them. The goal of those talks should be a peace agreement, but security, economic, political, and cultural confidence-building measures would have to be agreed upon to attain it. To demonstrate its commitment to Hezbollah’s disarmament, the Lebanese government would be smart to consider various measures that have a lower risk of triggering a military confrontation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces—a nightmare scenario that could lead to Lebanese bloodshed and divide the LAF along sectarian lines. Politically, the Hezbollah ministers should be expelled from the cabinet, along with the Iranian ambassador, their ultimate patron. Whereas Hezbollah’s members of Parliament are elected fairly and freely by their supporters, its ministers are appointed by the prime minister, so kicking them out and replacing them with patriotic Lebanese Shiites is perfectly legal. Removing archaic Lebanese legislation that prohibits contact between Lebanese and Israeli citizens is a good idea too. The Lebanese government should also outlaw the economic activities and financial arms of Hezbollah. In addition, it should freeze bank accounts and assets linked to Hezbollah and prohibit any direct or indirect financing. To forestall a broader conflict, the Lebanese government should order the LAF to deploy units to the Beqaa Valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut and clear the sites being targeted by the Israel Defense Forces of weapons or Hezbollah fighters. The U.S. military should verify the results. These measures should not be viewed primarily as efforts to please or placate Washington or any other foreign party. Rather, they are all meant to serve the Lebanese collective interest, and they should have been pursued a long time ago. [Mark Dubowitz and Richard Goldberg: Glimpsing victory in Iran] If the Lebanese government begins to execute these measures, the U.S. should stand ready to support its efforts. The U.S. should begin by appointing a new special envoy for Lebanon—an experienced diplomat to effectively liaise and coordinate with the U.S. embassy in Beirut. It should also mediate talks with Israel aimed at reaching a cease-fire, urging Saudi Arabia and other regional partners to support the effort. Any agreement would likely require a revamped approach to U.S. military assistance to Lebanon, involving the LAF being given the funds, equipment, and training it needs to more effectively conclude its disarmament duties. To support this, U.S. Central Command should create a new border-security program that is similar to the one the U.S. has with Jordan. And the U.S. would need to help raise funds for postwar reconstruction, perhaps via an international summit or by means of Donald Trump’s Board of Peace. Should the Lebanese government fail to demonstrate its commitment to disarming Hezbollah, Washington is unlikely to restrain Israel. Worse, lack of Lebanese progress could lead to U.S. diplomatic disengagement, including the freezing of aid to the LAF. Lebanon is too fragile to do what it must on its own, especially when it is once again being pummeled by Israel. But for Washington to help, Beirut must first help itself.