How active have Iran’s proxy groups been since the start of the war?

One of the most notable aspects of the war in Iran so far has been the extent of Tehran’s isolation in the region. This has been exemplified not only by the widening divide between Iran and its Gulf Arab neighbours, but also by the highly variable responses to the conflict by Iran’s proxy groups. Iran has relied on a network of proxies to protect and bolster its position in the region since the earliest days of the Islamic Republic in 1979. The most important elements in this network have been Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Syria under the rule of the Assad family, Iran-aligned militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. However, this network is in serious disarray as a result of various conflicts in the region since late 2023. Hamas has been devastated by the Israeli onslaught that followed the October 7 terrorist attacks in southern Israel, with a succession of its leadership killed during the conflict. This has left the group unable to play a part in the Iran war. Hezbollah, on the other hand, entered the conflict early on. The group has launched rockets, missiles and drones at Israel since March 2 in response to the killing of the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, in an Israeli airstrike days earlier. But Hezbollah finds itself damaged to the point it constitutes a far greater threat to Lebanese stability than it does to Israel. Hezbollah was subjected to an Israeli military campaign after attacking Israel following the start of the war in Gaza. Its political and military leadership were targeted, culminating in the assassination of the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in 2024. Hezbollah’s capacity to launch missiles into Israel was also degraded. The resumption of Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel now poses a very significant threat to Lebanon on political and humanitarian levels, while being largely ineffective in Israel to date. Lebanon’s health ministry says Israeli attacks have killed 968 people since March 2. No deaths have been reported in Israel, though two Israeli soldiers were killed in a Hezbollah ambush in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese president, Joseph Aoun, announced on March 2 that Hezbollah’s actions were unlawful. He also demanded that the group hand over its weapons, and spoke of Lebanon’s willingness to engage in formal negotiations with Israel to avoid the Israeli military imposing new security arrangements on the country. But the current conflict has exposed the Lebanese state’s limited capacity to control events in its own territory. Meanwhile, Israel has announced plans for an expanded ground campaign in southern Lebanon, fuelling fears of an extended occupation and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Like Hezbollah, Iran-aligned militias in Iraq joined the conflict soon after the US and Israeli assault on Iran began. They have targeted Israel, as well as US military bases in Jordan and Iraq, with drones and missiles. Iranian Kurdish groups in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq have also been attacked following reports that the US might arm them to fight the regime in Tehran. In response, Iraqi militias have been targeted by US and Israeli airstrikes. As in Lebanon, a weak central government in Iraq is struggling to maintain a balance between domestic and external forces. Elections in November 2025 saw a coalition of Shia parties emerge as the largest bloc in the Iraqi parliament. However, their nominee for prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, has been rejected by the US. This is due to the widely-held perception that he stoked sectarian tensions when he was last in office from 2006 to 2014 and is too close to the regime in Tehran. In the meantime, the caretaker government is struggling to contain the influence of pro-Iran militias while the war devastates Iraq’s oil sector. The Iraqi economy is heavily dependent on the sale of hydrocarbons, with oil revenues accounting for roughly 90% of government revenue. Oil production has reduced sharply since the start of the conflict. Houthis in Yemen The final Iranian ally of substance in the region, the Houthis, have been conspicuous by their absence from the fray. When the war in Gaza broke out in October 2023, the Houthis mounted a series of attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. The group also targeted Israel with long-range missile strikes, which were largely ineffective. The outbreak of the current war with Iran has led to protests and declarations of condemnation in Yemen, with Houthi leadership warning on March 5 that their “fingers are on the trigger”. But, so far, this has not been followed with concrete action. There are a number of possible explanations for this apparent reluctance to offer support to the regime in Tehran. Analysts such as Nadwa al-Dawsari of the US-based Middle East Institute have suggested that Iran may be holding any intervention by the Houthis in reserve. She argues that Tehran may be doing so on the basis that longer-range missile and drone attacks against the Gulf states and Israel will prove more effective later in the conflict. But it is also possible that Houthi leadership are fearful of the impact of US and Israeli retaliation should they become directly involved in the conflict. Previously, in August 2025, Israeli attacks killed at least 12 senior members of the Houthi leadership ranks. This included Ahmed al-Rahawi, the prime minister of the Houthi-controlled government in the Yemeni capital of Sana'a. However, whether the Houthi leadership has the capacity to withstand Iranian pressure to enter the conflict is doubtful. So they may ultimately be dragged in, if somewhat reluctantly.

Vincent Durac does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.